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U.S. Trade and Other
Policy Options and Programs
to Deter Foreign Exploitation
of Child Labor
Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorﬀ,
and Robert M. Stern
8.1 Introduction
Our paper deals with the increasingly important issue of the exploitation
of child labor in developing countries. This has in recent years attracted
considerable attention and debate in trade policy circles in the United
States and elsewhere. While child labor around the world is an acknowl-
edged fact, its magnitude and characteristics are imperfectly measured.
Notwithstanding this, our focus here is primarily analytical insofar as we
attempt to model family labor supply decisions in the context of an open
economy. This enables us to examine a number of policy options and pro-
grams for dealing with child labor exploitation. Hopefully, our work will
motivate others to take the next important measurement and empirical
steps that are needed to assess the current state of aﬀairs and to devise
methods for improving the work and living conditions of children and their
families in developing countries.
We begin in section 8.2 with a discussion of the determinants of child
labor and selected information on the global, national, and sectoral em-
ployment of children. In section 8.3, we discuss the range of policies and
programs used in the United States to help eﬀect a reduction in foreign
child labor. With the foregoing as background, we turn in section 8.4 to
conceptual considerations, using a framework that we have developed to
analyze the economic determinants of child labor and the expected conse-
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233quences of alternative measures that are designed to reduce child labor.
Conclusions and implications for further research and policy are presented
in section 8.5.
8.2 Determinants, Magnitudes, and Characteristics of Child Labor
It is useful to begin by considering what is meant by child labor. In west-
ern societies, chronological age is customarily used to separate childhood
from adulthood. In other societies, however, the way childhood is viewed
will often be determined by societal factors, including (1) the level of eco-
nomic development; (2) the level and composition of social expenditures;
(3) cultural considerations; and (4) the phase of demographic transition.
The distinction between work and education is also less clear in devel-
oping countries. There may be sectors in which children are apprenticed
for long periods of time in exchange for beneﬁts that may come later, after
they are trained and have acquired on-the-job experience. Child labor can
a l s ob ed i ﬃcult to detect—for example, few child workers can be found in
the export sectors. According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau
of International Labor Aﬀairs (1994, 2) only about 5 percent of employed
children work in the export industries in manufacturing and mining.
Rather, children are usually found in family-based agriculture, in such ser-
vices as domestic help, restaurants, and street vending, in prostitution, and
in such small scale manufacturing as carpets, garments, and furniture.
As a consequence, there is a wide range of uncertainty about the actual
magnitudes involved. Grootaert and Kanbur (1995, 188–89) report results
from an International Labour Organization (ILO) survey that concludes
that there were approximately 78.5 million economically active children
under the age of ﬁfteen years in 1990. Similarly, UNICEF reports 80 mil-
lion children aged ten to fourteen whose work is characterized as “so long
or onerous that it interfered with their normal development” (Grant 1991).
However, the total number of working children worldwide is thought to
be far greater. The ILO places the ﬁgure closer to 100–200 million (U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Aﬀairs 1994, 2). An
even larger estimate of child labor is found when the work of younger chil-
dren is included. For children between ages ﬁve and fourteen, the ILO esti-
mates that 250 million are working, of which 120 million are working full
time (U.S. Department of Labor, 1998, 1).1
In addition to the incidence of child labor, it is worthwhile to consider
the conditions under which children work. There is a wealth of information
provided by various sources concerning the nature of child labor. For ex-
ample, the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Aﬀairs
1. See Kruse and Mahony (1998) for estimates of the number of children and youth work-
ing under conditions that violate U.S. federal and state child labor laws.
234 Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorﬀ, and Robert M. Stern(1995, 2–5) describes work for children employed in commercial agri-
culture:
Large numbers of children may be found toiling in the ﬁelds and ﬁsher-
ies from daybreak until dusk. Many of these children work for commer-
cial farms and plantations or ﬁshing operations. Plantations, which pro-
duce commodities exclusively for export, employ 20 million persons, or
2 percent of the persons working in the agricultural sector in developing
countries. Children make up an estimated 7 to 12 percent of the work
force on plantations....A mong the products produced by children are
cocoa, coﬀee, coconuts, cotton, fruit and vegetables, jasmine, palm oil,
rubber, sisal, sugar cane, tea, tobacco, and vanilla. Children also dive
for ﬁsh, work on ﬁshing platforms and boats, and work in factories that
p r o c e s sﬁ s h ....T h eg r e a tmajority of children in agriculture work as
part of a family unit....W o r k d a y sc a nb ee x t r e m e l yl o n g ....Children
in agriculture face many safety and health risks....R egular exposure
to dangerous chemical fertilizers and pesticides poses another threat
to children.
Children delivered into bonded labor for the purposes of intergenera-
tional debt servitude perhaps suﬀer most of all. Human Rights Watch
(1996, 54) has documented bonded child labor in the Indian footwear in-
dustry. They estimate that between 2,000 and 20,000 bonded child labor-
ers as young as six or seven years old are traﬃcked from the rural villages
of Rajasthan to Mumbai annually. Further, Human Rights Watch (1996,
104–5) estimates that 10 to 20 percent of child laborers in the Indian hand-
knotted carpet industry are bonded workers. Generally, these children are
traﬃcked from Bihar or Nepal; a similar situation exists in Nepal itself.
Brokers known as naikes oﬀer rural families loans in exchange for their
children. The children are then sent to Kathmandu to discharge the fami-
lies’ debts by working in carpet factories.
Working conditions for bonded child laborers can be horriﬁc. The Bu-
reau of International Labor Aﬀairs (1995, 2–5) reports that
. . . Forced and bonded child labor can be found in all sectors of the
economy. Bonded children working in the carpet industries of India,
Pakistan, and Nepal may work up to 20 hours a day. They often sleep,
eat and work in the same small, damp room, and are sometimes locked
i na tn i g h t ....M a n yo ft h echildren suﬀer from skin ailments, chronic
colds, respiratory problems, spine deformities, and weakened eye-
s i g h t ....I nt h ej u n g l eo fs o uth-eastern Peru, children recruited by con-
tractors to work for nine months in gold mines ﬁnd they must continue
to work well beyond that period to pay [what] . . . they owe the contrac-
t o r s ....T h ef o r c e dl a b o ro fchildren occurs in the ﬁshing industries of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan....F o r c e d
child labor is also widespread in the informal service sector, particularly
in the employment of child domestic servants and in the sex indus-
Options to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor 235t r y ....Ad i ﬀerent form of child labor in the service sector is the use of
young boys, usually kidnapped from southern Asia, as camel jockeys in
Persian Gulf States.
Similarly, Human Rights Watch (1996, 104, 109) documents cases in the
Indian hand-knotted carpet industry in which children are “forced to work
long hours . . . for no wages or nominal wages . . . some being ill-treated,
beaten, tortured, abused, branded, and kept half fed, half clad.” Children
working with sharp instruments frequently cut themselves. The wounds
may be treated by “putting sulphur from match heads into the cuts and
then lighting them on ﬁre, thereby sealing the wound” and avoiding infec-
tion. As adults, these former child workers suﬀer from badly damaged
hands and eyes and stunted growth.
8.3 Policies and Programs for Reducing Foreign Child Labor
Having discussed some of the characteristics of child labor, we now con-
sider the policies and programs used in the United States to deter the
foreign employment and exploitation of children. These include (1) U.S.
trade policies, (2) economic and technical assistance provided through the
ILO, (3) supranational measures, (4) codes of conduct for U.S. ﬁrms en-
gaged in foreign production, and (5) consumer labeling. We brieﬂy discuss
each of the foregoing.
8.3.1 U.S. Trade Policies
Elimination of child labor exploitation is considered to be a core inter-
national labor standard, the others being prohibition of forced labor, free-
dom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and non-
discrimination in employment. For some time, the United States has had
a number of policies and programs designed to achieve these core stan-
dards and other standards that bear upon conditions of work; these are
summarized in table 8.1. The most recent measure is one sponsored by
Congressman Bernard Sanders (I-Vt.) in October 1997 as a rider to the
ﬁscal year 1998 Treasury Appropriations Act, which was approved by
voice vote in Congress and signed by President Clinton. Section 1307 of
the U.S. Tariﬀ Act of 1930 provides authority for the U.S. Customs Service
to prohibit “importation of products made, in whole or in part, with use
of convict, forced, or indentured labor under penal sanctions.” The Sand-
ers Amendment makes it “explicit that merchandise manufactured with
‘forced or indentured child labor’ falls within the prohibition of this stat-
ute.”2 With funding made available by Congress, the U.S. Customs Service
is currently attempting to devise and implement monitoring and inspection
2. For further details, see http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/enforce, childﬁ2.htm. See also
“Customs walks tightrope on new child labor law” (1997).
236 Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorﬀ, and Robert M. SternTable 8.1 Evolution of Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Policy Legislation
Year Act Labor Standards Provisions
1890 McKinley Act Prohibited imports made by convict labor.
1930 Tariﬀ Act, Section 1307 Prohibited imports of goods made by convict
labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under
penal sanction.
1933 National Industrial Permitted imports only if produced according to
Recovery Act (judged U.S. domestic fair labor standards, including
unconstitutional by U.S. the right to organize and bargain collectively,
Supreme Court in 1935) limits on maximum hours of work, and
minimum wages.
1974 Trade Act Directed the President to seek the adoption of
fair labor standards in the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations.
1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Extended criteria for eligibility as a beneﬁciary
Recovery Act country to include the degree to which workers
are aﬀorded reasonable workplace conditions
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
1984 Generalized System of Extended criteria for eligibility as a beneﬁciary
Preferences Renewal Act country to include whether the country has
taken, or is taking, steps to aﬀord its workers
internationally recognized worker rights,
deﬁned as including freedom of association;
the right to organize and bargain collectively;
freedom from forced labor; minimum age for
the employment of children; and acceptable
conditions of work with respect to wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.
1985 Overseas Private Investment Required the corporation to insure, reinsure,
Corporation Amendments guarantee, or ﬁnance a project in a country
Act only if the country is taking steps to adopt and
implement internationally recognized worker
rights as deﬁned for GSP purposes above.
1986 Anti-Apartheid Act Made it incumbent on U.S. ﬁrms employing
more than twenty-ﬁve persons in South Africa
to follow a code of conduct that includes fair
labor standards.
1987 U.S. participation in Made U.S. participation conditional on
Multilateral Investment countries’ aﬀording internationally recognized
and Guarantee Agency of worker rights to their workers.
World Bank
1988 Trade Act (Omnibus Trade Made the systematic denial of internationally
and Competitiveness Act) recognized worker rights (as deﬁned above) by
foreign governments an unfair trade practice
and liable for U.S. countermeasures where
such denials cause a burden or restriction on
U.S. commerce.
1997 Sanders Amendment to 1930 Included prohibition of merchandise
Tariﬀ Act, Section 1307 manufactured with forced or indentured child
labor.
Source: Adapted in part from Alam (1992, p. 25).procedures to ban imports produced by forced child labor in response to
complaints ﬁled.3
The United States also uses preferential tariﬀ treatment of exports to
induce developing country trade partners to reduce child labor under the
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Since 1984, the GSP pro-
gram speciﬁes a number of labor rights violations that might be cause for
suspension of GSP privileges. Evidence of a change in policies is a condi-
tion for the preferences to be reinstated.4
8.3.2 Economic and Technical Assistance Provided through the ILO
The United States provides a signiﬁcant amount of economic and tech-
nical assistance to developing countries through its bilateral foreign aid
programs and its contributions to multilateral institutions. For our pur-
poses here, we wish to call attention to U.S. assistance to address issues of
child labor that are channeled through the ILO. Thus, as noted in U.S.
Department of Labor (1998), President Clinton proposed in his ﬁscal year
1999 budget “a new initiative to ﬁght abusive child labor. The initiative
builds on the administration’s record of reporting on child labor, aiding
the private sector in the development of codes of conduct and labeling
eﬀorts, pressing successfully for a greater ILO focus on exploitative child
labor, leveraging change in the domestic garment industry through the use
of ‘hot goods’ [sic] laws, and using U.S. laws to suspend trade beneﬁts in
response to persistent exploitative child labor practices.”
What is especially noteworthy in particular is the U.S. assistance pro-
vided to the ILO International Programme for the Elimination of Child
Labor (IPEC):5 “ T h eP r e s i d e n t ’ sF Y9 9...b udget proposes that the U.S.
contribute a total of $30 million—a 10-fold increase—to IPEC in support
of programs aimed at reducing the most intolerable forms of child labor—
forced or indentured work, work by very young children, and work in the
most hazardous occupations. The U.S. funds will support multi-dimen-
sional programs including key elements such as in-country ownership,
innovative partnerships between governments, workers, and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations], development of reasonable educational al-
ternatives, monitoring, creative use of media, and documentation.”
U.S. contributions/pledges to IPEC as of March 1998 are indicated in
table 8.2. The total U.S. contribution of $8.1 million to IPEC since its
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3. According to the New York Times, the International Labor Rights Fund ﬁled a com-
plaint to ban imports of South Asian carpets under the provisions of the Sanders Amend-
ment (see “Ban sought on South Asian rugs” 1997). This complaint is presently under investi-
gation by the U.S. Customs Service. See also “Citrus squeeze” 1998.
4. Further details can be found in Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern (1996, 234–36).
5. IPEC (International Labour Organization [ILO] 1996a) identiﬁes three conditions that
characterize “intolerable” child labor: children working under forced labor conditions and in
bondage; children in hazardous working conditions and occupations; and very young chil-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.inception in 1992 will be increased signiﬁcantly by the funds appropriated
in the FY 99 U.S. budget. Twenty donor countries are presently providing
IPEC support to twenty-nine developing countries, with an additional
twenty-four developing countries preparing to participate. The U.S.-sup-
ported IPEC programs noted in table 8.2 evidently address many diﬀerent
aspects of child labor. As noted in U.S. Department of Labor (1998, 3),
this range of programs “suggests that interventions need to be made on all
fronts and that no single type of intervention is suﬃcient in itself. It is
exactly this type of broad based multi-sectoral action that ILO-IPEC is
promoting.” It is also noteworthy that IPEC strives to involve trade unions
and NGOs in its programmatic activities. Thus (p. 6), “In recent years, a
broad social alliance involving governments, NGOs, workers, and employ-
ers’ organizations, media, academic institutions and various other actors
has emerged in many countries—often as [a] result of the catalytic and
facilitating role IPEC has played.”
8.3.3 Supranational Measures
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the ILO is the main
international organization concerned with labor standards. Established in
1919, the methods and principles set out in the ILO constitution deal with
all conceivable aspects of labor standards. The ILO is primarily concerned
with (1) the deﬁnition of worker rights, especially through the adoption of
ILO conventions and recommendations;6 (2) measures to secure the real-
ization of worker rights, especially by means of international monitoring
and supervision, but not by imposition of trade sanctions; and (3) assis-
tance in implementing measures, especially through technical cooperation
and advisory services.
8.3.4 Codes of Conduct
On the domestic side, the Clinton administration has sought to work
with U.S. ﬁrms to develop codes of conduct that would limit imports of
goods produced by children as a matter of corporate policy. As noted by
the Bureau of International Labor Aﬀairs (1996, 12), “Corporate codes of
conduct are policy statements that deﬁne ethical standards for companies.
Corporations voluntarily develop such codes to inform consumers about
the principles that they follow in the production of goods and services they
manufacture or sell. Corporate codes of conduct usually address many
6. It is interesting that formal ratiﬁcation of ILO conventions diﬀers considerably among
ILO members, apparently because particular conventions may be at variance with national
laws and institutional practices. Thus, for example, as Rodrik (1996, 15–16) notes, the United
States has ratiﬁed only 11 of the 176 ILO conventions, whereas several other industrialized
and developing countries have ratiﬁed a signiﬁcantly larger number. Ratiﬁcation of ILO con-
ventions may therefore not be an accurate indicator of existing national regulations governing
labor standards, and there are many cases in which ratiﬁed conventions are not enforced.
240 Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorﬀ, and Robert M. Sternworkplace issues—including child labor—and, according to some observ-
ers are part of a broader movement toward corporate social responsibility.”
Codes of conduct have become more widespread in recent years, espe-
cially in the apparel industry. Firms in industries such as apparel that rely
heavily on foreign production may have a strong incentive to articulate
and carry out codes of conduct. By doing so, the ﬁrms can reassure con-
sumers that they are making serious eﬀorts to upgrade foreign labor stan-
dards and working conditions for both adults and children.7 However, the
degree of meaningfulness and eﬀectiveness that the codes of conduct will
achieve depends above all on their credibility. Of particular importance are
the transparency of the codes of conduct, monitoring, and enforcement.
8.3.5 Consumer Labeling
Several American and European importers have recently attempted to
go beyond a corporate code of conduct to communicate standards of em-
ployment to consumers. Many ﬁrms have adopted the strategy of labeling
products with statements that are intended to give the impression that
child labor was not employed during production.
Product labeling intended to combat illegal child labor began in ear-
nest in the 1990s. A brief summary of existing programs in hand-knotted
carpets, footwear, and soccer balls is provided in table 8.3. A thorough
description of each program can be found in U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of International Labor Aﬀairs (1997). The programs diﬀer dramat-
ically in their structures, underlying philosophies, and objectives. How-
ever, all of them state either on the product label or in the program’s litera-
ture that the objective is to produce goods that are not manufactured with
illegal child labor.
Labeling as a strategy for reducing child labor has received analytical
support from Freeman (1994), but it is not without its critics. First and
foremost, any campaign that removes a child from the workplace is vulner-
able to the charge that the welfare of the child has not necessarily been
improved. Work may simply be the diﬀerence between life and death for
some children. Eliminating jobs could easily leave child workers with
greatly worsened choices. In fact, some of the labeling programs (such as
for hand stitched soccer balls) that appear to have the greatest success in
credibly eliminating child workers have, in fact, the worst record in demon-
strating that children’s lives have been improved. More eﬀective may be
7. According to the New York Times, a presidential task force comprising human rights
groups, labor unions, and apparel industry giants reached an agreement that seeks to end
sweatshops by means of a code of conduct for wages and working conditions in foreign
apparel factories used by American companies (see “Apparel industry group” 1997). Subse-
quently, it turned out that it was not possible for all parties concerned to reach agreement
on the link between wages and the basic needs of workers. For this reason, some of the
participating labor unions and labor rights groups declined to support the agreement.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.greater attention to educational opportunities, and/or a subsidy that can
replace a child’s contribution to family income if the child attends school.8
The rehabilitation programs maintained by some labeling programs are
clearly an attempt to improve the options for children while eliminating
or reducing work. However, many child welfare projects associated with
labeling programs have encountered diﬃculties in providing services to
children. In the case of Rugmark Internationale (in table 8.3), resources
for supporting former child workers are inadequate. In other cases, the
administrators of labeling programs ﬁnd that they lack the expertise or
legal authority to administer child care programs.
Product labeling programs have also been criticized on grounds of the
credibility of the claimsmade on their labels. In orderto address these criti-
cisms,elaboratemonitoringprocedureshavebeenadopted.However,some
organizations believe that credible monitoring is simply an impossible task.
Licensed employers have been quite skillful in undermining the eﬀective-
ness of even the most carefully designed monitoring eﬀo r t ,a n di ti sn o t
uncommon for many of them to counterfeit labels.
8.4 Conceptual Considerations and Analysis of
Alternative Measures to Reduce Child Labor
In order to shed some light on possible eﬀects of various policies regard-
ing child labor, we use this section of the paper to examine the issue in the
context of a theoretical model. We will ﬁrst use the model to demonstrate
analytically the conditions under which child labor exploitation might oc-
cur. We then use the model to analyze the impact of three policies intended
to deter child labor, which are a complete ban on child labor, a nonprohibi-
tive tax on child labor, and a subsidy for education.
Themodelconsistsessentiallyof amicroeconomicmodeloflaborsupply
by a family—parent and child—embedded in a standard Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) general equilibrium model of production and trade. For both,
we draw upon more detailed work that has been done elsewhere, content-
ing ourselves here with giving only the ﬂavor of some of the results that
can be obtained, together with the intuition behind them.9
8. An educational subsidy program targeted at the children of Brazilian orange pickers has
produced very suggestive results. Citrovita Agro Industrial Ltd., the largest juice producer in
the town of Catanduva, funds an educational center for underprivileged youth. In addition,
the local government gives needy parents whose children maintain a speciﬁed school atten-
dance record a stipend of $45 per month per child. The stipend roughly equals the child’s
forgone earnings as an orange picker while in school. In the year since the program has been
in eﬀect, truancy in Catanduva has dropped from 18 percent to less than 1 percent. The
success of the program in Catanduva clearly stems from two characteristics. First, the sub-
sidy is paid only in lieu of work by the child; and, perhaps more importantly, the program
designers are willing to accept the parents’ decisions as to how each family’s subsidy is spent.
As a consequence, the community has replaced work with school as a way for the child to
bring resources into the household.
9. For related work, see Basu and Van (1998) and Basu (1999).
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We use a two-cone version of the HO model, which most closely and
simply captures the large diﬀerences that exist between the developed and
developing parts of the world.10 That is, while we assume that countries
everywhere share the same constant-returns-to-scale technologies for pro-
ducing several goods from primary inputs of capital and labor, the factor
endowments of countries are suﬃciently diverse as to prevent factor price
equalization (FPE) among all of them. Instead, the world is divided into
two cones of factor proportions. In the more capital-abundant cone of the
North, we ﬁnd the factor endowments of the rich developed countries.
Within that cone, these countries have FPE among themselves, and they
produce and collectively export goods from the capital-intensive end of
the factor intensity spectrum. At the same time, the less capital abundant
countries of the South occupy a more labor abundant/intensive cone. They
too have FPE among themselves, and they specialize in labor-intensive
goods. Factor prices can diﬀer markedly between these two parts of the
world, with the South having much lower wages (and higher returns to
capital) than the North.
For the most part, too, the South produces diﬀerent goods than the
North, while within the South countries specialize further among the vari-
ous labor-intensive goods depending on their factor endowments relative
to other countries in the southern cone. The countries with the smallest
endowments of capital per worker, which will be the focus of our attention
here, will pay the same wages as other countries in the same cone, due to
FPE among them. However, they will tend to produce and export a diﬀer-
ent selection of goods, concentrating on the most labor-intensive of the
larger group of labor-intensive goods produced in the South.
For simplicity and concreteness of results, we allow only two factors in
our discussion, capital and labor. One may think of human capital as be-
ing implicit in the model but aggregated together with capital. One could
also allow some exogenous variation in the amount of eﬀective labor per
worker, especially across countries. More importantly, we explicitly allow
the labor factor in the South to encompass both adult and child labor as
perfect substitutes, with children contributing only a constant fraction of
the eﬀective labor input of an adult.
Before moving on to the micromodel of labor supply, several familiar
properties of this HO trade model may be noted. First, as long as world
prices of all goods remain unchanged, factor prices of countries within a
cone will not change with variations in their factor supplies. This is the
lesson of FPE,11 and it applies within a cone of a multicone model as much
10. See Deardorﬀ (1979).
11. Causing Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) to call it the “Factor Price Insensitivity
Theorem.”
Options to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor 245as in the more familiar textbook model with a single cone. Second, if prices
of goods change, as they will when large changes in factor supplies cause
changes in world supplies of goods, then factor prices change in accor-
dance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, that theorem must
be interpreted within the context of a cone of specialization. That is, when
the relative price of a good goes up, the eﬀect on factor prices within a
cone—say, the South—depends on whether that good is produced there
at all, and, if it is produced, on the factor intensity of the good relative to
that of others in the same cone.12 If the good is not produced, then its
higher relative price simply lowers the real wages of all factors in the cone;
but if it is produced, then this raises the real return to the factor used
intensively in its production, relative to other goods in the same cone.
These familiar properties of the HO model, in their perhaps unfamiliar
guises in the multicone model, will be useful later, when we discuss the
general equilibrium and world market implications of various policies for
dealing with child labor.
8.4.2 Parent and Child Labor Supply
Unlike most applications of the HO trade model, ours will assume vari-
able labor supply, and in particular we will make a distinction between
supply of adult labor and supply of child labor. Our model of a family has
just two people, a parent and a child, with a single utility function that is
intended to reﬂect the interests of both. Both members of the family can
potentially contribute to that utility by three means: leisure, home produc-
tion, and market production. The model is static, but the leisure of the
child can be taken to include time spent in school, and the contribution of
the child’s leisure to family utility can therefore encompass the future re-
turn to education. Home production represents whatever the family mem-
ber can contribute directly to the family’s welfare by working in the home
(or on the family’s land) to produce goods and services for the family’s
own consumption. It does not include work he or she may do at home to
produce goods for sale or in a subcontracting arrangement with a ﬁrm.
Such work, although done at home, is part of market production, which
of course may also be done elsewhere (in a factory or on a plantation).
Family utility depends on these three arguments—leisure, home con-
sumption, and market consumption—each of which may be contributed
by one or both family members. These three arguments in the utility func-
tion are not, in general, perfect substitutes, and indeed we will further
specify the pattern of substitution among them shortly. The contributions
of parent and child to each of these arguments, however, are taken to be
perfect substitutes for each other, though not on a one-for-one basis. Thus,
each hour of home production by the parent will yield some ﬁxed amount
of home consumption, while each hour of home production by the child
12. See Davis (1996).
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sumption. Likewise, working in the market, each family member earns a
ﬁxed wage, again with the child’s wage presumably being smaller than the
parent’s. The contributions of each family member’s leisure time to family
utility are similarly ﬁxed per hour, although here we presume (and hope)
that the family places a higher value on the child’s leisure than on the
parent’s. If the family does not, then we may get what we take to be the
pathological (but perhaps all too common) case of true exploitation of
child labor.
We will not attempt here to explore this model in full detail and rigor,
but it may nonetheless be useful to lay it out formally.
8.4.3 The Model
The notation in the model is as follows:
Ch, Cm Consumption of home produced and market purchased
goods
Ti, Hi, Li Time allocated to leisure, home production, and market
production by family member, i  p, c f o rp a r e n ta n d
child respectively
vi, ai, wi Productivity of time allocated to leisure vi (in terms of
utility), home production ai (in terms of home produced
consumption), and market production wi (the wage) for
family member i
C, T Eﬀective total consumption (CES aggregate) and leisure
Tp, Tc Time available for parent and child respectively (ex-
cludes biologically necessary leisure)
j  (j  1)/j CES utility parameters, j  U, C
The equations for the model are as follows. The family is assumed to
choose Ti, Hi, Li, i  p, c, to solve the following maximization problem:
(1) max[ ] ,
/ CT
UU U   +
1
subject to
(2) CC C hm
CC C =+ [] ,
/   1
(3) Tv T v T pp c c =+ ,
(4) Ca Ha H hp pc c =+ ,
(5) Cw Lw L mp pc c =+ ,
(6) HLT T pp p p ++= ,
(7) HLT T cc c c ++= .
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that C  1 as we assume, and if consumption and leisure are not close sub-
stitutes, such that U  1 as we also assume, then this formulation yields a
backward-bending supply curve of labor. That is, if we raise both wages
while keeping their proportions ﬁxed, total labor supply ﬁrst rises with the
wage at low wages, but falls thereafter with further increases in wages.
Exactly who does what within this family depends both on the level of
the wages and on the productivities of the parent and child in satisfying
their various needs. Because the formulation here is linear, it is convenient
to think in terms of parents’ and children’s each having comparative ad-
vantage in one or another activity, much as in a Ricardian trade model
with three goods. That is, we can order the three activities—leisure, home
production, and market production—by the ratio of the parent’s and the
child’s productivity, to get a chain of comparative advantage. It follows,
exactly as in a Ricardian trade model, that neither family member will
engage in any activity in which he or she has a comparative disadvantage
unless the other family member is already devoting all of his or her time
to it as well.
















The motivations here are (1) that the child is less productive than the adult
at both home and market production, so that the ﬁrst and second ratios
are both less than one; (2) that the family sees greater utility value in the
child’s leisure than in the parent’s, partly out of care for the child and
partly because the child’s leisure includes the beneﬁts of education, so
that the third ratio is greater than one; and (3) that the child’s greatest
comparative disadvantage is in market production. With this assumed or-
dering, the child will never engage in market production unless the parent
is already devoting all of his or her time to market production as well; but
this can happen, if the wages of both are low and productivity of home
production is even lower.
In general, under the assumptions in equation (8), the only patterns of
intrafamily specialization that can be observed are those depicted in table
8.4. Which of these patterns is chosen then depends upon all of the param-
eters, including the market wage rates.
For our purposes here, we care most about the implications of the model
for labor supply. Two aspects of this will be of interest: how the total labor
supply of the family varies when wages of parent and child move together,
and how they vary when the wage of only one family member changes
while the other is ﬁxed. The ﬁrst case is depicted in ﬁgure 8.1.
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as they would (and will in our discussion) if the child’s productivity in
market production is some ﬁxed fraction of an adult’s while both become
more or less valuable with varying market conditions. Letting wc/wp
 1 be that fraction, we graph the family’s total eﬀective labor supply in
units of the parent’s labor, LS  Lp 
 Lc, as a function of the parent’s
wage. When both wages are very low, even the parent provides very little
market production, since the parent can use his or her time more produc-
tively at home. As the wages rise, the parent increases his or her labor
supply, but because of the child’s comparative disadvantage in market pro-
duction, the child remains at home, engaged in leisure and probably home
production. Only when the rising wage has drawn the parent into market
production full time does the family even consider putting the child to
work as well, and even then the wages must rise a bit more before that
happens. Now, as wages rise further, we ﬁnally do see child labor, its
amount increasing, for a time, with the wage.
With the assumed elasticities of substitution, however, there comes a
point at which further increases in both wages cause the family to reduce
labor supplied to the market, and with the assumed pattern of comparative
Table 8.4 Patterns of Intrafamily Specialization
TH L






Options to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor 249
Fig. 8.1 Family labor supply as wages vary togetheradvantage, it is the child’s labor that is withdrawn ﬁrst. Only when the
wages have risen to the point that the child no longer works in the market
does the parent’s labor supply begin to decline as well.
We can also ask how labor supplies vary if we change one wage while
holding the other ﬁxed. Of greatest interest will be changes in the child’s
wage, so that is the case we consider here. Suppose, starting from some
point on the labor supply curve in ﬁgure 8.1, that the child’s wage now
changes while the parent’s does not. (Of course, if the child was not work-
ing initially, then a small change in the child’s wage will not change the
child’s employment status. Most interesting therefore are cases in which
we start with the child already working.) Two such cases are shown in
ﬁgure 8.2.
Here we have magniﬁed the portion of the family labor supply curve
along which the child works, shown as the solid curve LS. Then for two
arbitrary points selected on this curve, marked A and B,w ed r a wp o r t i o n s
of the labor supply curves that would be observed if only wc were then to
change. In both cases, the broken curves show what would happen if wc
were to vary (as it does along LS)b u twp were to remain ﬁxed at wA and
wB, respectively. In both cases, because a fall in the child’s wage is now
not accompanied by the income loss of a fall in the parent’s wage as well,
the family cuts back more on the child’s labor supply than it does along
LS. Thus, where the labor supply was positively sloped as at A, its response
to a fall in only the child’s wage is more elastic than if both wages fell
together; if the labor supply was negatively sloped as at B, the response
becomes less elastic.
From this we see something like a trade-oﬀ between the income of the
family and the eﬀect that can be obtained on child labor by changing the
child’s wage. If the family is very poor, as at point A, then a reduction in
the child’s wage rate will discourage the family from having the child work,
at the cost, of course, of reducing the family’s income still further. On the
other hand, if wages are somewhat higher to start with, as at B, so that the
family has reached the point at which further wage increases will reduce
child labor, a fall in the child’s wage will have the perverse eﬀect of causing
him or her to work more. As we will see, this case may have some relevance
for policy.
Not depicted previously but always true under the assumed pattern of
comparative advantage is the eﬀect of a change in the parent’s wage on
child labor. Starting again from a situation in which the child is already
working, a rise in the parent’s wage has the same eﬀect on the family as
an increase in the family’s wealth, since it simply raises the income from
the maximum number of hours that the parent is already working. Because
the utility function is homothetic in consumption and leisure, this can only
reduce the amount of market production that the family asks the child to
provide, and this increases the child’s leisure. By the same token, a fall in
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and it may well put the child to work if he or she was not already there.
What our model cannot tell us very clearly is the eﬀect of any of these
changes on thewelfare of the childalone. We have chosen tomodel the util-
ity of only the family unit, not of the individuals within it. Certainly a rise
in either wage beneﬁts the family as a whole, even though a rise in the
child’s wage may cause the child to work longer hours. That this may none-
theless beneﬁt the child, however, is quite possible, since the family enjoys
greater market consumption as a result.
8.4.4 The Bad Parent
The case we have considered so far, with equation (8), provides the most
favorable interpretation of child labor, in which children work only if their
parents are already working the maximum that they biologically can, and
the family acknowledges the high cost to the child (in forgone leisure) of
working. The family nonetheless sends the child to work if the need for
what the child can earn is large enough due to both low wages overall and
low productivity at home. Based on the evidence we have described earlier
in the paper, we believe that this captures reasonably well a large fraction
of the child labor observed in the world.
It does not capture all of it, however. As we have discussed, many chil-
dren are trapped in situations so harsh that it is implausible that they are
beneﬁting at all from the arrangement. When children are essentially sold,
as bonded laborers or in other similar arrangements, and when they live
apart from their families with their wages given to the family instead of to
them, then it seems clear that only the parents are beneﬁting, and at the
children’s expense.
Our model can capture at least one aspect of such behavior by simply
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Fig. 8.2 Family labor supply as child’s wage variesreducing the utility value that the family unit places on the child’s leisure,
vc. Reduced suﬃciently, this will alter the ordering in equation (8), putting
the child’s comparative advantage in leisure below that of both kinds of
work. The possible patterns of specialization that one may now observe
are altered from those previously laid out. It is now easy to generate a
scenario in which it is the child who works the maximum that is physically
possible, either at home (Cinderella) or in the market (as essentially slave
labor). Indeed, if we completely reverse the ordering of equation (8), the
same graphs of labor supply that we used before will apply, but with the
identiﬁcation of parent and child labor supply reversed. It is worth noting
that, even in this case, a reduction in the wage of the child worker may
induce the parent to force the child to work more, not less, though only if
the child is not already working the maximum.
8.4.5 Policies toward Child Labor
We turn now to a discussion of several policies that might be used to
discourage child labor, in the hope that our model may help to illuminate
their eﬀects. We will consider three policies: a complete ban on child labor,
a nonprohibitive tax on child labor, and a subsidy to education. In each
case we consider ﬁrst the eﬀects if the policy is applied “in the small” (to
a small enough part of the developing world that it will not change world
prices), and second if it is applied “in the large” (to all less developed
countries [LDCs] as a group).
Ban on Child Labor
Suppose ﬁrst that child labor is simply and eﬀectively banned within a
single small LDC. If that does not alter wages of parents, then under the
assumptions of our model the families of child workers are unambiguously
made worse oﬀ. They lose the income of the children, and we know from
their choice to put the children to work in the ﬁrst place that they view
the beneﬁts of that income as exceeding its costs. We can question whether
the children themselves are worse oﬀ, of course, but only if we doubt the
goodwill of the parents.
But won’t the ban in fact alter the parent’s wage? With less labor sup-
plied by children, then one might expect the wages of the remaining work-
ers to be bid up. That would be true in a closed economy, but in the small
open economy, as assumed here, it is not. As long as factor price equaliza-
tion holds, the wages of parents—which are determined by unchanged
world prices of goods—will not be changed by the ban on employing
their children.
Thus it is only when we expand the ban on child labor to much or all of
the developing world that we can expect to ﬁnd an eﬀect on adult wages.
In that case, the ban reduces labor supply in enough of the world to reduce
the supply in world markets of the most labor intensive goods, and the
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Stolper-Samuelson theorem in action—that we can expect to see the ban
on child labor improving the wages of the parents. This is hopeful, but
there is still no assurance that the increased wage of a parent more than
makes up for the lost wage of the child and thus that families or their
children are made better oﬀ. This will depend on many things, including
the elasticity of demand for labor-intensive goods.
A Nonprohibitive Tax on Child Labor
We next consider a nonprohibitive tax on child labor. We do this not
because anyone has proposed this as a desirable policy, but because many
policies that have been proposed and used have eﬀects similar to such a
tax. A campaign of opprobrium, for example, leveled against employers
of child labor, implicitly raises the cost to them of that employment, but
it may not raise it enough to stop their doing it. A well-advertised program
of labeling can have a similar eﬀect, by causing unlabelled merchandise to
sell at a discount.
Suppose then that such a tax is implemented, again in the small to start
with. The productivity of children’s labor is not altered by the tax, and
therefore potential employers will continue to be willing to employ them
for a wage equal to that productivity minus the tax. In other words, the
eﬀect of the tax is simply to lower the wage received by child workers.
Since it does not alter the wage of their parents (FPE again), the scenario
is exactly that of ﬁgure 8.2. The tax may therefore either increase or de-
crease the hours worked by children, depending on which portion of the
labor supply curve they were in; but unambiguously the welfare of the
children’s families is reduced. Thus the tax almost certainly does not make
the children better oﬀ (except perhaps in the case of the bad parent), and
i tm a ye v e nc a u s et h e mt ow o r km o r e .
As in the case of the ban on child labor, the tax may possibly become
beneﬁcial if it is levied in the large, on enough of the developing world to
alter world prices. Note in this case, however, that labor supply may rise,
not fall, such that the eﬀect on world prices would be opposite that of a
ban and could lower prices of unskilled-labor-intensive goods and thus the
implied unskilled wage.
Of course, the analysis of a tax is not complete without an accounting
for how the revenue from it is used, but that is an issue only if it really is
a tax. If costs are increased by other means, as suggested previously, then
there is no revenue, even potentially, to oﬀset the adverse eﬀects on the
child workers and their families.
A Subsidy to Education
We noted earlier the recent moves that have been made toward pulling
children out of work instead of pushing them into not working. By oﬀering
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alter in an important way the calculus of their decision making. In the
previous model, this would alter equation (5) to include the market con-
sumption that can be ﬁnanced by the subsidy:
(5 ) ′ =++ Cw Lw Ls T mp pc c e c ,
where se is the education subsidy. If se  wc, then the eﬀect is extreme,
since the family would never then send the child to work. Even with a
smaller subsidy, however, the change in incentives can have important
eﬀects, and it seems clear that this can only reduce child labor. Further-
more, and unlike the other policies, this subsidy can only beneﬁt the fami-
lies, not harm them.
This is true in the small, when wages are ﬁxed by FPE, and it is equally
true in the large—for once again, by reducing the supply of child labor, a
broadly used education subsidy has the potential to reduce the world
supply of unskilled labor. This in turn can raise the world prices of goods
that these workers produce, as well as their wages.
This all sounds ﬁne, but of course we have not accounted for the very
real cost of ﬁnancing the subsidy. As usual in matters of this sort, unless
a market failure is being corrected, a subsidy will itself distort markets and
cause a net reduction in overall economic welfare. In this case, because
the gains to the poor families of the child workers seem clear, these gains
are smaller than the cost of the subsidies. It probably would not be hard
to dream up market failures to justify this cost, but we do not view that as
necessary. Redistribution of world income toward the poor is suﬃciently
diﬃcult that advocates of redistribution would not condemn a policy such
as this on the grounds of a little economic ineﬃciency. On the contrary, if
the world can harness the righteous indignation over child labor to the
cause of truly helping these children and their families, many would view
the eﬀort as worth the cost.
8.5 Conclusions and Implications for Policy
In section 8.3 we noted ﬁve kinds of policies and programs that have
been suggested or used for deterring the employment of children. We con-
clude by revisiting them, providing our assessment of their desirability
from the perspectives both of our analysis in section 8.4 and of broader
considerations. To avoid repetition, we address the policies and programs
in three groups.
8.5.1 Trade Policies
As might be expected from trade theory, the case for the use of trade
restrictions to deter child labor has several analytical weaknesses. Objec-
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causes or from a concern that the real motivation for such policies is the
protection of domestic interests of the developed countries rather than the
welfare of exploited children. It is also the case that if such protection is
the actual objective, then there are forms of intervention other than trade
restrictions that provide higher welfare for all concerned.
More importantly, however, is the welfare of the exploited children
themselves, and whether they are truly helped by, say, a boycott of the
goods they are employed to produce. If such a boycott were truly com-
plete, then the eﬀect would be that of a ban on child labor, as discussed
earlier. Such a ban would indeed reduce the employment of children, but
except perhaps in the case of bad parents, it would hurt the children rather
than helping them. Furthermore, if trade restrictions eﬀect only a partial
boycott—being implemented by some importing countries rather than
all—or if they merely lower the net prices of imported goods that continue
to be produced with child labor, then the eﬀect will be similar to that of a
tax on child labor. Here, as we saw, the children are hurt while their em-
ployment may actually rise.
8.5.2 ILO Assistance and Other Supranational Measures
We have already noted that funds have been contributed by the United
States and other developed countries to the ILO’s IPEC for improving
labor standards. These funds can be used in a variety of ways, and they
are not without their pitfalls; but they potentially provide the means for
truly alleviating the plight of working children and not just removing them
from view. To the extent that such funds are used to subsidize the educa-
tion of poor youth, and in particular to provide them and their families
an incentive to remove them from more arduous activities, these programs
act much like a subsidy to education. It is notable that the amount of
money contributed to these programs by the United States, though laud-
able, is miniscule compared to what the United States contributes to many
other domestic and even international initiatives.
8.5.3 Codes of Conduct and Labeling
Neither codes of conduct nor consumer labeling (which in eﬀect simply
helps producers to gain a marketing advantage from their codes of con-
duct) unambiguously improve the welfare of children. To the extent that
they only reduce the demand for child labor or, equivalently, raise its per-
ceived cost to potential employers, these initiatives cater more to the sensi-
tivities of western ﬁrms and their customers than to the needs of the chil-
dren who are said to be their focus. Indeed, simply to stop employing an
impoverished child could be viewed in some cases as more harmful than
employing the child—again with perhaps the exception of children of bad
parents or children in forced or bonded labor.
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evaluated simply by determining whether the aﬀected children are still
working. Rather, the outcomes for children should also be measured in
terms of standard of living, educational attainment, and so forth. As we
have discussed, the more carefully constructed codes and labeling schemes
have in fact devoted some of their revenues to educating, feeding, and
housing former child workers. So far, this role has been a very limited
one—limited by the licensing fees that labelers can collect and by the gen-
erosity of corporations.
The role for consumers in improving the welfare of children hinges on
the need to identify the fundamental sources of child poverty (not merely
child labor) and to make their product choices accordingly. Perhaps the
pursuit of proﬁts by corporations can be harnessed to this end, but the
beneﬁts will accrue to child workers only if they and their families actually
receive additional resources.
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Comment Robert W. Staiger
Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern have written a very useful paper on an impor-
tant topic. The topic is child labor, and the ﬁrst thing the paper does is to
provide a very thoughtful survey of existing research with regard to the
determinants, magnitudes, and characteristics of child labor. This survey
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a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.is especially valuable in serving at a broad level to remind the reader of
two important points. First, the magnitude of the problem in developing
countries is huge (tens and possibly hundreds of millions of children work-
ing under conditions that “interfere with their normal development”). And
second, developed countries will face severe limitations if they seek to ad-
dress this problem directly by withholding market access for goods pro-
duced with child labor (evidently only a very small percentage of all child
workers are employed in the export industries of developing countries).
The second thing the paper does is to provide a description of the vari-
ous programs and policies used in the United States to deter child labor
in foreign countries. These include unilateral actions taken by the U.S.
government, actions taken by the U.S. government that work through in-
ternational agencies, attempts by the U.S. government to facilitate corpo-
rate codes of conduct, and private sector attempts to engineer product
labeling programs. An important issue associated with the last two men-
tioned programs concerns monitoring, and the paper elaborates, from the
perspective of a simple theoretical model, on a number of the problems
involved with monitoring.
The third thing the paper does is to develop a simple general equilibrium
model to examine the impacts of various policies on the use of child labor.
A model of family labor supply is embedded in a traditional two-cone
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Within the family, the parent and the child can
allocate their time to leisure, home production, and/or market production,
and children are assumed to have a comparative disadvantage in market
production. With appropriate elasticity assumptions, family labor supply
will eventually become “backward bending”: that is, ﬁxing the relative
wages of parent and child, rising wages will ﬁrst lead to greater family
labor supply but eventually to reductions in family labor supply. Given the
comparative disadvantage of the child in market production, family labor
is supplied to the market ﬁrst by the parent, and only as the wages rise
further (in ﬁxed proportion) will the child eventually be pulled into market
employment. As wages rise further still, and the backward-bending por-
tion of the family labor supply curve is reached, child labor supply to the
market is reduced.
If, after the description of the complexities associated with the problem
of child labor contained earlier in the paper, any reader still believes that
policy responses to the problem should be obvious, then this simple model
should dispel that view. Consider, for example, the relatively straightfor-
ward goal of reducing child labor (and forget about the far more subtle
task of attempting to ensure that child welfare is actually enhanced). The
model nicely illustrates how the supply of child labor to market production
will be a non-monotonic function of wages, and this result is most evident
when only the child’s wage is varied: As the child’s wage is reduced, very
poor families (on the upward-sloping portion of the family labor supply)
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the backward-bending portion of the family labor supply) will increase
child labor supply to the market. Hence, whether aggregate child labor
rises or falls as the market wage of children is reduced depends on, among
other things, the distribution of family income across the economy. The
broader implication is that it may be extremely diﬃcult for the developed
world to ﬁnd simple policies that reliably reduce child labor in the devel-
oping world if these policies work through their eﬀects on prices and
wages.
The Heckscher-Ohlin features of the model are also nicely put to work
in the analysis of the eﬀects on family welfare of an outright ban on child
labor. Unless the ban applies to signiﬁcant portions of the developing
world, it will not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the prices of internationally traded
goods, and hence factor prices in a developing country to which the ban
applies will not be aﬀected (factor price insensitivity), and the impact on
family income will simply be the lost income of the child. Only if goods
prices are altered by the ban will family incomes in the developing world
a l s ob ea ﬀected by changes in the wages of parents, with the direction of
these changes predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
My discussion thus far has focused on things that are in the paper which
I like, and there are many of these. There are also things that are not in
the paper which I would like to have seen the authors discuss (of course,
I can always hope that these things will be the topic of some of their future
work). In particular, I think that to make much more progress on the issue
of child labor in the developing world, we are going to have to begin to
confront in a systematic fashion a number of questions that the paper
doesn’t really raise, though these are questions that to some extent lurk
around the edges of the discussion. The ﬁrst question to which I refer is
simply this: Why is the developed world unhappy with the treatment of
child labor in the developing world? (I.e., What is the problem?) Only after
we are comfortable with our answer to this ﬁrst question can we seek an-
swers to the second: What should be done about the treatment of child
workers in the developing world? (I.e., What is the solution?) The remain-
der of my comments will focus on a number of possible answers to these
questions.
Why is the developed world unhappy with the treatment of child labor
in the developing world? One possible answer is the “race-to-the-bottom”
fear that low-cost products of child labor will erode the living standards of
workers in the developed world, who must compete with these developing
country exports. For example, the additions to the labor force of the devel-
oping world that are implied by the lax or nonexistent child labor laws in
these countries may aﬀect living standards of workers in the developed
world through the greater availability of labor-intensive exports from de-
veloping countries. According to this answer, the developed world cares
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resulting trade eﬀects, and a pecuniary externality of international dimen-
sions is thereby created through the impact of child labor laws on ex-
porter prices.
Whether this externality leads to ineﬃcient policy choices, and hence to
a “problem” that all governments could in principle agree to “solve”
through negotiations of some kind, depends at least in part on whether
countries can aﬀect exporter prices through their policy choices. But even
if there is an ineﬃciency of this type, it is tied fundamentally to concerns
over market access (i.e., trade eﬀects), and this has important implications
for answers to the second question raised earlier. In particular, as I have
argued in other work (Bagwell and Staiger 2000 and forthcoming), this
problem can be handled at least in theory with market access negotiations
under existing GATT rules (appropriately modiﬁed). Hence, if this is the
problem, then GATT’s existing principles may be well equipped to provide
the solution, and as a consequence there may be no need to embark on a
major shift of approach to ﬁnd solutions to the problem of child labor in
the developing world.
However, there are other possible answers to this ﬁrst question. The
mere fact that the United States has federal child labor standards of its
own suggests the possibility that, as a country, we are uncomfortable with
the child labor outcomes that an unconstrained market would deliver. Per-
haps, if we want to answer the question of why we care about the labor
standards of other countries, we might seek answers through national in-
trospection: Why do we perceive the need to adopt labor standards of our
own? I can think of at least three distinct answers (and I am sure there are
many more).
First, a national child labor standard may provide parents with a com-
mitment device with respect to their children, and hence solve an intrafam-
ily time-consistency problem. For example, a parent may hope to induce
his or her child to expend eﬀort throughout the school year by announcing
that the child will have to continue to attend school the following year,
regardless of this year’s performance; but at year’s end, if the child is failing
school, the parent may well have reason to rethink his or her announced
policy, perhaps allowing the child to quit school and enter the workforce
after all. If the child anticipates this, he or she may be less inclined to
expend eﬀort at school, and the parent may then encounter diﬃculties
achieving the desired educational goals for the child. In this situation, a
federal child labor standard, which keeps children below a speciﬁc age out
of the workforce and in school and is enforced by sanctions, can help par-
ents achieve a desired degree of credibility with respect to their children.
Notice, however, that while this argument might provide a rationale for a
country to adopt a child labor standard of its own, it does not by itself
provide a separate reason why one country might care about the labor
standards of another country.
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inﬂux of low wage child labor from undercutting the wages of adult work-
ers. Under this logic, if we choose to prevent our own children from under-
cutting the wages of our adult workers, we might well wish to prevent the
children from developing countries from doing this as well. Notice, how-
ever, that this simply gives a reason for the developed world to care about
the trade eﬀects of the developing world’s child labor standards, and thus
this is a special case of market access concerns generated by an interna-
tional pecuniary externality, as just noted. Hence, this would not by itself
provide a separate reason why one country might care about the labor
standards of another country.
Third, a national child labor standard may be in place to correct a non-
pecuniary externality that each family’s child labor supply decision exerts
on others. In this case, the key question is whether this externality is na-
tional or international in scope. For example, if the externality related to
child labor supply decisions concerns the impact of these decisions on the
likelihood of criminal activity later in life, then this is likely to be an exter-
nality of national scope, and as such it would not provide a separate ratio-
nale for why one country might care about the labor standards of another
country. On the other hand, perhaps we care directly about the welfare of
children other than our own and we don’t trust all parents to make deci-
sions that serve the welfare of their children. For example, it may be that
most parents are well equipped to solve on their own the time-consistency
problem noted earlier, but that as a nation we support the cost of admin-
istrating federal child labor standards because some parents are not so
equipped, and we care about the welfare of their children. In this case, our
direct concern for the welfare of children might extend as well to the chil-
dren of the developing world, and then we would be directly aﬀected by
the child labor standards chosen by a developing country. Here is a reason,
separate from market access concerns, why one country might care about
the labor standards of another country.
I don’t know which, if any, of these cases is relevant in practice, and it
may well be that I have left out entirely the most important reason or sets
of reasons for why the developed world cares about the labor standards
chosen by the developing world. It seems clear, however, that identifying
the possible reasons for the problem is a crucial step in ﬁnding a solution.
For example, if the sources of the problem can be tied to market access
concerns, as in the race-to-the-bottom sort of fears described previously,
then GATT’s market access focus can probably be utilized to provide the
solution. On the other hand, if the source of the problem is not tied to
market access concerns, but reﬂects instead international externalities of
a nonpecuniary nature as in the ﬁnal case described previously, then solu-
tions might be better found outside of GATT, perhaps utilizing instead
the ILO.
In any event, let me summarize. The paper written by Brown, Deardorﬀ,
Options to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor 261and Stern has contributed to the important task of characterizing the facts
of child labor in the developing world, and it has also taken an important
step in showing how our familiar models of international trade can help
to illuminate the impacts of various policy options on the supply of child
labor in the developing world and on the welfare of child workers. What is
now needed is to take a step back, and to ask why the developed world
cares.
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